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Forty Years in Search of 
Arab-Israeli Peace
William B. Quandt
I. Background to the Conflict
The conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors is overlain with 
history and religion, but it is best understood as a product of two 20th-
century nationalist movements that sought self-determination and 
statehood in the same small piece of land. The British, who held the 
League of Nations’ mandate over Palestine, never found a mutually 
acceptable plan for self-government by Jewish Zionists and Palestinian 
Arabs during their moment of preeminence (1920–1947). It fell to the 
newly formed United Nations to recommend partition into two states, 
one Jewish and one Arab. The Palestinians, backed by their Arab breth-
ren, did not accept the partition, decided to wage war against the new 
state when the British withdrew, and were badly defeated, but not van-
quished, on the battlefield.
Over the years that followed, there were truces, outbreaks of fight-
ing, secret and not-so-secret negotiations, but the next big turning point 
in the conflict came with the Israeli victory in the so-called Six-Day War 
of June 1967. This opened the way to a new phase of diplomacy, which 
is essential to understand as background to the current crisis.
II. The Framework: U.N. Resolution 242
As noted, a crucial moment for the region, and for the United States, 
came in June 1967 when war broke out between Israel and most of her 
Arab neighbors. Within a matter of days, Israel had won on the battle-
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field and was in occupation of Arab territories in Sinai, Gaza, the West 
Bank, and the Golan Heights.
President Lyndon Johnson, at the time preoccupied with the war 
in Vietnam, made a crucial judgment that there should be no return 
to the status quo ante. Instead, the United States would support Israel 
in holding the newly occupied territories until the Arab states were 
prepared to recognize Israel and make peace. This stand was broadly 
endorsed by the international community with the acceptance of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 242 in November 1967. (See Appendix A)
The basic trade-off envisaged in this important document is between 
Israeli withdrawal “from territories occupied in the recent conflict” 
and “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect 
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in the area and their right to live 
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats 
or acts of force.” While the resolution stopped short of calling for full 
Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory and for full peace trea-
ties, it was understood at the time, and subsequently, as calling for an 
exchange of “land for peace.”
While Resolution 242 established the basic equation that has guided 
subsequent Arab-Israeli peacemaking, it left many questions unan-
swered. For example, it referred only obliquely to the Palestinians, call-
ing for a “just settlement of the refugee problem.” It said nothing about 
what might happen in the West Bank and Gaza, inhabited by a mil-
lion or so Palestinians and now under Israeli military occupation. Nor 
did it address the sensitive issue of the status of Jerusalem, formerly 
divided between Israel and Jordan and now under full Israeli control 
and annexed to Israel proper.
III. The Peace Process
If Resolution 242 became the centerpiece of Arab-Israeli peace efforts 
after 1967, it nonetheless is fair to say that little actual peacemaking 
occurred until after the next big conflict in the region, the October 
1973 War. Frustrated by their inability to break the stalemate that had 
endured on both the diplomatic and military fronts since the 1967 War, 
Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on October 6, 1973. Coming 
at a crucial moment in the Cold War and in the embattled presidency 
of Richard Nixon, the war provoked not only a regional crisis but also 
a global one. This persuaded Nixon and his energetic Secretary of 
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State, Henry Kissinger, to devote unprecedented diplomatic efforts to 
finding a solution to the conflict.
Kissinger introduced several techniques into what came to be known 
as the “peace process.” First, he traveled frequently to the area to deal 
with presidents, prime ministers, and kings on a face-to-face basis. 
This came to be known as “shuttle diplomacy,” and ever since has 
been something of a standard by which many judge the seriousness of 
the American commitment to getting results from diplomacy. Second, 
Kissinger was skeptical of grand bargains, package deals, and the abil-
ity to solve long-standing conflicts quickly. Thus, he urged the parties 
to focus on practical, small steps toward peace rather than insisting 
on settling all problems at once. This came to be known as “step-by-
step” diplomacy, and three negotiated agreements resulted: Sinai I and 
Golan I in early 1974, and Sinai II in fall 1975.
IV. Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Kissinger not only helped break the diplomatic logjam between Israel 
and her Arab neighbors, but also asserted American supremacy over 
the negotiation process. In his view, only the United States, in part 
because of the unique relationship that it maintained with Israel and 
because of its economic and military assets, was in a position to pro-
vide the carrots and sticks necessary to move the local parties to make 
the concessions needed for peace. An early convert to this view was 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was fond of declaring that the 
United States held “99 percent of the cards” in its hands. (He knew 
this was an exaggeration, but wanted Americans to take seriously the 
major responsibility that they had assumed as custodians of the peace 
process.)
By the time Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977, there 
had been no progress in Arab-Israeli diplomacy for more than a year 
and tensions were on the rise, especially as the situation in Lebanon 
deteriorated. Carter and his advisers concluded early on that step-
by-step diplomacy had reached an end. It was time, they believed, 
to see if a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace could be achieved. This 
would mean, in Carter’s view, getting the Arab parties to face up to 
the requirements for peace: the recognition and security that Israel 
needed. It also entailed the territorial withdrawal and recognition of 
Palestinian rights that were central demands of the Arabs. Carter was 
the first American president to talk of a “Palestinian homeland,” a 
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controversial term at the time and one that made clear that the Pales-
tinian issue had to be seen as a political, not simply a humanitarian, 
issue. Unfortunately for Carter, there was no consensus on who should 
speak for the Palestinians in future negotiations. Jordan, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), and even Egypt were all considered at 
various times.
While any American leader in 1977 would have been obliged to 
deal with the Arab-Israeli crisis on some level, Carter surprised even 
his closest aides by devoting an extraordinary amount of time to this 
one issue. His motives, no doubt, were complex. On the one hand, his 
religious convictions seem to have played a role. He had been raised 
on the Bible and stories of the Holy Land. The idea of helping to bring 
peace to “The Children of Abraham” was deeply appealing to him.
Carter also saw the complexity of the issues as a challenge, not a 
reason to turn away from the conflict. He had been told as a southerner 
that racism was simply a fact of life that could not be changed, and 
he had rebelled against that view. Similarly, when experienced politi-
cians told him that the Arab-Israeli conflict was toxic and insoluble, it 
simply enhanced his desire to prove them wrong. But one should not 
dismiss the role of hardheaded strategic calculus in Carter’s decision 
to throw himself into Arab-Israeli peacemaking. He was acutely aware 
that only a few years earlier the conflict had exploded, with dramatic 
consequences for the United States. The price of oil had skyrocketed; 
the U.S. and Soviet Union had nearly confronted each other; Anwar 
Sadat had come close to losing his gamble. Kissinger had defused the 
crisis with his step-by-step diplomacy, but there was no reason to think 
things could remain quiet without further diplomatic efforts by the 
United States. Certainly this was the view being argued by his closest 
security advisers. So, for Carter, some very personal motives meshed 
with some very obvious national security interests. The result was an 
unprecedented degree of direct presidential involvement.
Carter’s ambitious vision of a comprehensive peace was dealt a 
harsh blow in mid-1977 with the election of Menachem Begin as Prime 
Minister of Israel. Begin headed the Likud Party, whose central tenet 
was that Israel had a right to keep all of what he called “Judea and 
Samaria,” or the West Bank. This ran directly counter to the views of 
those who had crafted U.N. Resolution 242, as did Begin’s insistence 
on Israel’s right to build civilian settlements in these territories. Carter 
and his team were frustrated by Begin’s intransigence, but they pushed 
forward, soon discovering an opening on the Egyptian-Israeli front.
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Sadat was worried about the loss of momentum in the peace process 
and decided to try to break what he saw as a “psychological barrier” to 
peace by traveling to Israel in November 1977 and calling for “no more 
war.” The effect in Israel was electrifying, and it soon became clear that 
the best chance for peace now lay between Egypt and Israel. Sadat and 
Carter still hoped that something could be included for the Palestin-
ians, but Begin was very reluctant to accept such “linkage.”
In mid-1978, Carter began to despair of ever seeing Begin and Sadat 
make peace. Therefore, he resorted to high-stakes diplomacy and 
invited them to a summit meeting at Camp David in September 1978. 
The setting was secluded, the pressures were intense, and the atmo-
sphere was far from friendly and accommodating. But over a period of 
thirteen days, with very direct involvement of the president, two docu-
ments, The Camp David Accords, were drafted and agreed upon—one 
a general framework for peace and the other an outline of a specific 
treaty between Egypt and Israel. (See Appendix B)
Carter’s method for persuading Begin and Sadat to compromise was 
distinctive. With Begin, he was inclined to persuade through lengthy 
argumentation. In addition, he enlisted the help of one of Begin’s 
trusted aides, Attorney General Aharon Barak. It was often Barak, a 
relatively moderate voice among the Israelis, who would come up 
with a formula that Begin could accept. At no point did Carter threaten 
Begin with a suspension of economic or military assistance, although 
Begin must have been aware that if he were widely seen as responsible 
for the failure of the talks, there could be some erosion of support for 
Israel.
With Sadat, Carter had a very different and friendlier relationship. 
In his memoirs, Carter speaks of Sadat in almost reverential terms. He 
genuinely felt that Sadat was a man of peace. It also helped that Sadat 
was not much of a stickler for details, most of which he left to his assis-
tants. Yet he was firm on certain principles. At one point during the 
Camp David negotiations he announced that he was leaving because 
he was convinced that Israel was not prepared to return the Sinai to 
Egypt. Carter went to see him and told him bluntly that he could not 
leave without endangering both their personal relationship and the 
overall relationship between the two countries.
It has sometimes been alleged that Carter pressured or bribed one 
or the other of the principals with offers of (or threats to withdraw) 
aid. This is fundamentally wrong. With the Israelis, there were neither 
explicit nor implicit threats. But there was an offer of $3 billion in cred-
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its to help pay for the relocation of airbases from the Sinai. With Egypt, 
there was an expressed willingness to consider substantial military 
and economic assistance after the conclusion of peace between Israel 
and Egypt, but this was not codified or given any specific content until 
much later. Sadat had every reason to expect an improved relation-
ship with the United States if he made peace with Israel—that was his 
primary goal, after all—but he had remarkably little in the way of con-
crete commitments from the President.
The reaction to the Camp David Accords in much of the Arab world 
was surprise and opposition. Many noted a detailed plan for Egyptian-
Israeli peace based on the “land for peace” formula of U.N. Resolution 
242, but nothing comparable addressing the Palestinian question or the 
Syrian front. In the view of many Arabs, Sadat had agreed to a “sepa-
rate peace,” a cardinal sin in terms of Arab nationalist norms. As it 
soon became clear that Begin had not agreed to halt settlement activity 
in the West Bank and Gaza, whatever benefit of the doubt might have 
been given to the aspects of Camp David that were designed to appeal 
to Palestinians began to fade away.
As the euphoria that followed Camp David began to fade, some of 
Carter’s advisers feared that he was spending too much time on a los-
ing proposition. They thought he should turn his attention to domestic 
affairs in anticipation of the re-election campaign that would be fought 
in 1980. But when Carter decided on one more role of the dice, his trip 
to the Middle East to wrap up the treaty negotiations in the spring, it 
was precisely his domestic adviser, Hamilton Jordan, who urged him 
on. In his view, if Carter let peace slip away, he would be blamed as 
a weak and ineffectual leader. His only hope was to invest a bit more 
energy and get the best deal that he could. In fact, there was little oppo-
sition within the Carter inner circle to this view, but later the logic of 
turning to other issues did reassert itself, and that resulted in Carter’s 
decision to turn the Palestinian part of the Camp David Accords over 
to the politically savvy Robert Strauss.
The Egyptian-Israel peace, however, was achieved, and Carter was 
its prime architect. Sadat, who had made the peace possible with his 
dramatic overture to Israel in November 1977, had gone too far to turn 
back. In March 1979, the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty was signed on 
the north lawn of the White House. (See Appendix C)
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V. Bringing in the Palestinians
Carter was aware that peace between Egypt and Israel did not mean 
the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But he and most Americans none-
theless saw it as a major step in the right direction, one that established 
a model of sorts for future peace efforts, and one that would make pos-
sible a dramatically new relationship between Cairo and Washington.
If he had been re-elected, Carter almost certainly would have 
resumed the peace process, probably focusing on the Palestinian issue. 
He had come to the conclusion that this was important in its own right, 
and that it also had broad strategic implications in a region that was 
being convulsed by competing nationalist and religious visions. The 
revolution in Iran had raised concern about a wave of radical Islamist 
movements challenging the prevailing order and trying to use the Pal-
estine issue to win legitimacy in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims. But it 
was left to Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, 
and George W. Bush to find a way to resolve this most difficult part of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
During much of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the central 
question for diplomats trying to move forward on Arab-Israeli peace 
was “who can speak for the Palestinian people?” For most Arabs, the 
answer was simple: the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO. The 
PLO did not accept U.N. Resolution 242, however, and had not agreed 
to give up what it called “armed struggle” and the Israelis and Ameri-
cans called “terrorism.”
In addition, the Palestinian question involved much more than find-
ing an acceptable representative for the Palestinian people. The sub-
stantive issues that would have to be resolved eventually included 
territory (would the West Bank and Gaza be the core of a future Pales-
tinian home, or perhaps even a state?); Jerusalem (would some or all 
of east Jerusalem come under Palestinian control?); and refugee claims 
(could Palestinians expect to return to their original homes in Israel 
proper, or at least receive compensation for those lost properties?). 
Israelis and Palestinians were sharply divided amongst themselves 
and between the two sides, and it was a rare American politician who 
dared to express an opinion on these sensitive issues.
One way out of the impasse seemed to be to bring King Hussein of 
Jordan in as spokesman for the Palestinians (the Jordan option), either 
on his own or as head of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This 
might help get around the PLO’s refusal to accept Res. 242 and Israel’s 
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unwillingness to deal with the PLO. President Reagan spelled out the 
logic of this approach in September 1982. The Reagan Plan urged Israel 
to stop its settlements and to return most of the West Bank and Gaza 
to Jordanian control, while stating explicitly that the United States did 
not favor an independent Palestinian state, preferring some form of 
association between the Palestinian Territories and Jordan. (See Appen-
dix D)
Prime Minister Begin did not like the plan and it never progressed, 
but the Jordan option remained a point of reference for U.S. diplomacy 
until almost the end the Reagan presidency.
In late December 1987, a surprising change took place in the Pales-
tinian Territories, which had been under Israeli control since 1967. A 
whole generation had now come of age in the West Bank and Gaza and 
it was tired of living under occupation. In contrast to the older genera-
tion of Palestinians living there, they were willing to demand an end to 
the occupation and to do so forcefully. This was the beginning of what 
came to be known as the first Intifada, from the Arabic words “shaking 
off.”
Seven months after the Intifada began, King Hussein of Jordan 
made a historic speech in which he declared that Jordan no longer 
had any claim to the West Bank. Henceforth, anyone wanting to deal 
with the Palestine issue should talk to the PLO. After a few rounds of 
back-channel diplomacy, that is exactly what the Reagan administra-
tion agreed to do in its waning days. But first, it insisted that the PLO 
accept Resolution 242, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and renounce 
terrorism. In December 1988 in Geneva, Arafat met all of those condi-
tions and the United States agreed to start talking to the PLO. Another 
barrier to peacemaking had fallen, although it took time before the 
Israelis would follow suit.
VI. Going for Broke, Coming Up Short
Early in the presidency of Bill Clinton, a breakthrough in the peace 
process occurred that had little to do with American diplomacy. On the 
margins of a negotiation process that had been launched by George H. 
W. Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, in Madrid, Spain, in 
October 1991, Israel had been meeting with non-PLO Palestinians in 
Washington, as well as with Jordanians, Lebanese, and Syrians. The 
framework for a comprehensive peace was being discussed. Yet the 
Israelis found that little headway could be made in the official chan-
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nels, so they opened a second track with the help of the Norwegian 
government. There Israelis met with PLO negotiators and reached 
agreement on what came to be known as the Oslo Accords, signed at 
the White House on September 13, 1993. Letters of mutual recognition 
also were exchanged. (See Appendix E)
During the whole of the Clinton presidency, two tracks of peace-
making were pursued, sometimes in parallel and sometimes in compe-
tition. One was an effort to push forward the Oslo process, as it came 
to be called, through incremental steps that would lead eventually to 
Israeli-Palestinian peace. Needless to say, this was a difficult, frustrat-
ing process, marked by fits and starts as one side or the other pulled 
back from making the hard decisions needed for compromise.
The other track was between Syria and Israel. In many ways it was 
more straightforward. The Israelis wanted security and recognition; 
the Syrians wanted their territory back. An eventual agreement almost 
certainly would have to resemble the Egyptian-Israeli peace plan and 
be based on the “land for peace” formula of Resolution 242. At vari-
ous moments during the 1990s, Israel and Syria came very close to 
reaching agreement on these terms, but by the end of the Clinton 
presidency, there was still enough of a gap to keep the two sides from 
reaching agreement.
The Palestinian-Israeli issues came to a head in mid-2000. Clinton 
decided to go for broke in the waning days of his presidency. He sum-
moned Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO leader Yasser Ara-
fat to a summit meeting at Camp David (Camp David II). But unlike 
the first Camp David summit in 1978, this one ended in failure, and 
the American side placed most of the blame on Arafat. Nonetheless, 
negotiations continued and Clinton made one last effort on December 
23, 2000, for the first time putting forward specific proposals to bridge 
the gap between the two sides. (See Appendix F)
Both sides expressed reservations, but once again the American side 
concluded that it was Arafat who stood in the way of an agreement.
VII. The Bush Administration and the Two-State Solution
President George W. Bush came to office just as the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiating process was collapsing. A new and tough Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ariel Sharon, made it known that he would not deal with 
Arafat. Before long, that became the stance of the United States as well. 
In the West Bank and Gaza, the situation deteriorated rapidly as the 
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so-called Second Intifada gained momentum. Violence escalated. Israel 
took back control of parts of the West Bank and Arafat was soon iso-
lated in Ramallah. Peace seemed a distant dream.
President Bush, meanwhile, had to deal with the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The wars in Afghani-
stan and Iraq became major preoccupations at the expense of Arab-
Israeli peace diplomacy. Still, as early as mid-2002, Bush placed new 
cards on the table. First, he called for new Palestinian leadership, mak-
ing it clear that he had no intention of dealing with Arafat. At the same 
time, he spoke openly of a new Palestinian state living side-by-side in 
peace with Israel. The details remained to be worked out, but the goal 
now was explicit.
Arafat died in November 2004, and by January 2005, a new Palestin-
ian president, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected. By this time, Sharon had 
decided that negotiations could take a back seat to unilateral Israeli 
moves and he had committed to withdrawing his troops and settlers 
from Gaza by fall 2005, while speeding the construction of a barrier 
between the West Bank and Israel. Many thought the barrier eventu-
ally would mark the line that Israel might be prepared to accept as a 
future border.
January 2006 saw two dramatic developments. Sharon suffered a 
massive stroke from which he did not recover. He was succeeded by 
Ehud Olmert, a less experienced politician who took time to find his 
footing. On the Palestinian side, elections were held for the Legisla-
tive Council in January 2006 and the Hamas Islamist movement won 
a surprising victory. This meant that the new democratically elected 
prime minister would be from a party that still contested Israel’s right 
to exist, while the president was from the Fatah mainstream and was 
committed to negotiations.
This awkward situation prevailed well into 2007, when the two 
major factions within Palestinian society engaged in a sharp conflict 
that left Hamas in control of Gaza and the PLO dominant in the West 
Bank. The unity government experiment was ended and a new Fatah/
Independent government was established by Abbas, with somewhat 
doubtful legitimacy.
It was in these politically fraught circumstances that Israel and the 
Palestinians resumed talks to see if common principles for peace could 
be found. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice organized a meeting of 
Israelis, Palestinians, and some other Arab country representatives in 
late November 2007 in Annapolis, Maryland, to restore momentum to 
the peace process.
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Not for the first time, there was a real sense on the American side 
that much was at stake, that time was short, and that moderate and 
constructive leadership was needed. As important, Americans now 
seemed to recognize that Israeli-Palestinian peace would help advance 
American interests in the broader Middle East, where the United States 
is more deeply involved than ever. Progress has been glacial, however, 
and it was widely assumed that little would be achieved in coming 
months.
VIII. Where To From Here?
Whether one is an optimist or a pessimist, hopeful or despairing, the 
questions must still be asked. How can one best assess the chances for 
Arab-Israeli peace in the near future? What do we have as evidence? 
What relevant historical lessons can we access?
Since we cannot know with any degree of confidence what has 
really been going on in the recent rounds of Israeli-Palestinian talks, 
it makes sense to start with a glance back at previous efforts to reach 
peace agreements. By doing so, we may be able to identify conditions 
in which agreements have actually been reached and implemented.
If we look at the period from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War until today, 
we can see that there have been a large number of direct and indirect 
negotiations between the various Arab parties and Israel. Some were 
substantive, some primarily procedural, some successful and some 
not. But there has been a lot of activity.
A. Arab-Israeli Peace Initiatives
1967: June 19 Proposals; UN Resolution 242
1969: Rogers I Proposals
1970: Rogers II Proposals
1971: Suez Canal Disengagement Initiative
1973: UN Resolution 338; The Geneva Conference
1974: Sinai I; Golan I
1975: Sinai II
1977: October 1 US-Soviet Joint Communiqué
1978: Camp David I
1979: Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
1982: Reagan Plan
1983: Lebanon-Israel Peace Framework
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1985: Jordan-Palestine Confederation Proposal
1987: International Conference Proposal
1988: Shultz Initiative
1989: Baker Initiative
1991: Madrid Conference
1993: Oslo I
1994: Cairo Accord; Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty
1995: Oslo II
1997: Hebron Accord
1998: Wye River Agreement
1999: Shepherdstown talks; Sharm al-Sheik Memorandum
2000: Geneva Summit; Camp David II; Clinton Parameters
2003: The Road Map
2007: Annapolis
What, if anything, can we learn from these past experiences? Let’s look 
at all the negotiations that led to agreement and implementation.
I tend to focus on the strength of leaders and the role played by the 
United States. Notice that all the successful cases cluster in the upper 
left corner of my fourfold table.
Now let’s add the cases where agreement was reached but never 
implemented.
Agreements Reached and Implemented:
Leadership and Outcomes
Strong Israeli Weak Israeli
Strong 
Arab
1970: Rogers II
1974: Sinai I; Golan I 
1975: Sinai II 
1978: Camp David I 
1979: Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
1991: Madrid Conference 
1994: Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty
Weak 
Arab
Ambiguous Cases: 1967: UN Res 242; 1973: UN Res 338; Geneva Conference
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And now the failures.
The next model adds the mediation role of the United States.
Agreements Reached, Not Implemented:
Leadership and Outcomes
Strong Israeli Weak Israeli
Strong 
Arab
Weak 
Arab
1983: Lebanon-Israel Peace Framework
1993: Oslo I
1994: Cairo Accord
1995: Oslo II
1997: Hebron Accord
1999: Sharm al-Sheik Memorandum
2003: The Road Map
1998: Wye River Agreement
Failed Initiatives:
Leadership and Outcomes
Strong Israeli Weak Israeli
Strong 
Arab
1969: Rogers I
1977: US-Soviet Joint Communiqué
1999: Shepherdstown talks
2000: Geneva Summit (Clinton-Asad)
Weak 
Arab
1971: Suez Canal Disengagement
1982: Reagan Initiative
1985: Jordan-Palestine Confederation
1987: International Conference
1988: Shultz Initiative
1989: Baker Initiative
2000: Camp David II
          Clinton Parameters
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This shows pretty clearly that the best chance of success has been 
when there is strong leadership on both the Israeli and Arab sides and 
when the United States has played a strong substantive mediating role. 
The models on the U.S. side in this regard are Henry Kissinger, Jimmy 
Carter, and James Baker. We might also conclude from these cases that 
the Clinton period was a real lost opportunity. Never have there been 
so many agreements that were not fully implemented. In 1994–95, 
Rabin, Asad, and Arafat were all fairly strong politically, but Clinton 
was hesitant and an opportunity was lost. Again in 1999, Asad and 
Barak were both fairly strong, but Clinton was unwilling to push hard 
at Shepherdstown for an agreement. By 2000, when Clinton finally 
decided to get more deeply engaged on the Israeli-Palestinian front, 
Barak and Arafat were both losing political support and Clinton him-
self was running out of time. Thus negotiations were unsuccessful.
What about today? The Israeli and Palestinian leaders are both polit-
ically weak within their own domestic settings. On the other hand, 
they are on speaking terms with each other and there even seems to 
be a degree of mutual respect. But weak leaders do not make good 
peacemakers. On the U.S. side, we have an administration that started 
Strong Substantive American Mediation (Set in Bold)
(*denotes primarily Procedural Mediation)
Leadership and Outcomes
Strong Israeli Weak Israeli
Strong 
Arab
1969-70: Rogers I and II 
1974: Sinai I; Golan I 
1975: Sinai II
1977: US-Soviet Joint Communiqué*
1978: Camp David I
1979: Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty 
1991: Madrid Conference
1994: Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
1999: Shepherdstown talks*
2000: Geneva Summit*
Weak 
Arab
1971: Suez Canal Disengagement* 
1982: Reagan Initiative*
1983: Lebanon-Israel Peace
1983: Oslo I
1984: Cairo Accord*
1995: Oslo II*
1997: Hebron Accord*
1999: Sharm al-Sheik Memorandum*
2003: The Road Map*
1985: Jordan-Palestine 
   Confederation*
1987: International Conference*
1988: Shultz Initiative*
1989: Baker Initiative*
1993: Wye River Agreement*
2000: Camp David II*
2000: Clinton Parameters*
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out in 2001 very skeptical about the “peace process” and a president 
who thought that Clinton’s efforts had been counterproductive. On the 
whole, this means that the U.S. held back from active involvement in 
mediation. Occasional pronouncements were made, but—particularly 
during the Sharon era—the Bush administration held back and let the 
Israeli leader set the pace. One might have expected things to change 
after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, but by early 2006, 
there were two new realities to deal with: the election of a Hamas-led 
government in Palestine and Olmert’s succession as Prime Minister 
after Sharon’s stroke.
The combination of relatively weak leaders and weak American 
involvement suggests that the most that might result from the cur-
rent peace talks will be an agreement on some general principles. On 
the Palestinian side, vague principles will do little to help President 
Mahmoud Abbas and could even weaken him. Unless he can point to 
some fairly substantial gains for the Palestinians, this is not going to 
strengthen his awkward position. In addition, the fact that on the U.S. 
side this will be Condoleezza Rice’s moment in the sun, not Bush’s, 
does raise some serious questions about how much the U.S. is really 
prepared to do to get results in the short time remaining on Bush’s 
watch.
Let’s look a bit more closely at the situation. Olmert has a fairly 
narrow base of support and is in an awkward coalition with his rival, 
Ehud Barak. Yet public opinion in Israel will probably support him if he 
were to adopt “moderate” positions for a “Two-State Solution.” There 
is a fatigue factor at work on both sides—Israeli and Palestinian—that 
just might dampen some of the ideological passions that colored previ-
ous rounds of talks. In any event, if Olmert moves to the center, he has 
a chance to gain support, especially at a time when the Abbas-Fayyad 
government is seen by many Israelis as the best partner they have had 
to deal with since the days of Sadat and King Hussein. This suggests 
that Olmert could go at least as far as Barak did in late 2000, more or 
less accepting the Clinton parameters, without getting into too much 
trouble. But is he really ready to recognize Palestinian sovereignty over 
most of the Old City of Jerusalem? He has never hinted at anything 
like that. Would he and his coalition make any token concessions on 
the Palestinian “right of return”? To date, it seems that the answer is 
no. Where he might be flexible is in the realm of land swaps that would 
mean that a future Palestinian state would have a territory equal in size 
to all of the West Bank and Gaza.
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Abbas is in an even more tenuous position than Olmert. He has 
some support, especially in the West Bank and internationally, but 
not much among Palestinians abroad and in Gaza. While Palestinians 
might stand to gain some control over territory and removal of some 
of the irritants of everyday life (the checkpoints), they will not get 
anything close to their minimum demand of the right of return, and 
maybe not even as much as Arafat was offered on Jerusalem. Could 
Mahmoud Abbas sell a deal perceived as grossly unfair to the Palestin-
ians today? Could he withstand the likely criticism from both Hamas 
and some from within the Fatah mainstream? At a minimum he would 
have to be able to point to early statehood, a good territorial deal, a 
very generous scheme for compensating refugees for their losses, and 
some degree of Israeli recognition of its responsibility for the tragedy 
that has afflicted the Palestinians. This may not sound like much to 
some Palestinians, but even this will be hard for him to get from the 
Olmert (or any other) Israeli government.
All of this, of course, is supposed to be agreed upon by the end of 
2008, according to President Bush. It is, no doubt, a good thing that the 
two sides are talking, but my reading of the tea leaves is that they have 
not really made a lot of progress. If, however, they do manage to reach 
agreement on some general principles (and I am not entirely pessimis-
tic about their ability to do at least that), the next and more difficult 
challenge will be to translate the principles into a detailed agreement 
and then to implement it. There is simply no precedent in Arab-Israeli 
relations for weak parties being able to take such big and complex 
steps. Olmert would have to remove at least 100,000 settlers from the 
West Bank and would have to relinquish control over sensitive parts of 
Jerusalem. Abbas would have to explain to Palestinians that the “right 
of return” was to the state, not to their homes. Although most Palestin-
ians may know this on some level, they still believe it is deeply unjust, 
and Abbas will have a hard time explaining such a fundamental aban-
donment of a key Palestinian demand. Consequently, apart from the 
possibility of another “memorandum of understanding,” I do not have 
high hopes for a negotiated agreement in the near term.
As far as I can tell, modest expectations are also the conventional 
wisdom in official Washington. The prevailing view is that we should 
encourage small steps, not a “go-for-broke” effort to solve the conflict 
once and for all. We have heard this all before—the need to allow con-
fidence to build up between the parties, the need for the situation to 
“ripen,” and the (unspoken) need to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict as 
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much outside the realm of upcoming election-year politics as possible. 
All this is music to Olmert’s ears, but hard for Abbas to swallow.
The fact that Hamas is now excluded from the Palestinian govern-
ment (at least in the West Bank) has given rise to a degree of optimism 
in some quarters in Washington and in Israel. But driving Hamas into 
a corner is almost certainly going to make it more, not less, difficult to 
get a Palestinian consensus on the terms of a peace with Israel. I would 
be more hopeful if there were a Fatah-Hamas-Independent unity gov-
ernment back in place, but that, of course, was anathema to both Israel 
and the U.S. The Hamas-Israeli ceasefire, concluded in mid-2008, might 
be a step in the right direction if it can hold.
What about the Syrian front? Israel and Syria have been engaged 
in cautious indirect talks since early 2008, with Turkish mediation. It 
is worth noting that this was done over the objections of the United 
States, which would prefer to isolate, and possibly replace, the regime 
in Damascus.
There is a certain logic to the Israeli-Syrian track. Getting Syria 
into the game, as Baker did in Madrid in 1991, would put pressure 
on Hamas (Khalid Meshal is in Damascus). It would drive a wedge 
between Syria and Iran, to some extent, and would give Hizbollah 
reason to show restraint. In addition, quite a few prominent Israelis, 
including the foreign minister, have shown interest in negotiations 
with Syria (the issues are pretty clear cut; the strategic gains could be 
substantial). We know that President Asad has said repeatedly and in 
public that he is ready for peace talks, but he has also made clear that 
the return of Syrian territory would be the price. He wants the United 
States involved for a variety of reasons: side payments, reassurance, 
getting off the terrorist list, backing off the Hariri investigation, no 
more talk of regime change from Washington, etc.
I am inclined to think that many Israelis would like to try the Syr-
ian gambit. If they are really worried about Iran and Hizbollah and 
Hamas, peace with Syria might have some real dividends. Thus far, 
however, the two parties seem to be going through the motions rather 
than seriously negotiating. Although the Bush administration contin-
ues to be standoffish, it is no longer adamantly opposed.
In fall 2007, I asked a senior U.S. official directly if it was U.S. policy 
to block Israeli-Syrian talks even if Israel wanted them. The answer 
was yes. The reason was that as long as the U.S. policy was aimed at 
changing the regime in Damascus, or at least it policies, those changes 
had to precede negotiations. Negotiations would be a reward for a 
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new democratic regime, or a radically transformed Asad regime (think 
Libya), but not a down payment. In the words of this official, “Diplo-
macy only makes sense when you have the power realities lined up in 
your favor first, and that is not yet the case with Syria.”
With that as a guideline, previous administrations would never 
have talked to the Syrians, or to the PLO for that matter. This is a fun-
damental problem. The Bush administration still thinks of diplomacy 
as a favor that we do for our “moderate” friends, not as a part of the 
normal toolkit of being a world power. Until we have a president who 
is able to explain to the American public what the national interest is in 
a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and has the courage to use the full 
range of diplomatic influence to advance a peace agenda, we are likely 
to see more go-slow gestures that are designed not to raise expecta-
tions too high lest the U.S. be seen as tackling “controversial” issues 
that the parties to the conflict are not ready to confront.
IX. Final Thoughts
There is an emerging school of thought that claims that a negotiated 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer possible and perhaps 
no longer very important to the United States. Some talk optimistically 
of an alternative, a single state in which Israelis and Palestinians will 
coexist as equals. That seems to me to be a very far off prospect, how-
ever appealing it might be.
The real choice, I believe, is between a negotiated “Two-State,” 
“land for peace” type of agreement versus the continuation of the type 
of conflict we have witnessed in the past ten or more years. While the 
precise dimensions of a Two-State Solution would be difficult to work 
out, the general outline is pretty obvious. We have the Clinton propos-
als and the subsequent Geneva Accords, negotiated by non-official 
Israelis and Palestinians in order to demonstrate the possibility of find-
ing compromise solutions to the major problems of territory, settle-
ments, Jerusalem, security, and refugee claims.
I continue to feel that the United States, for reasons of its own self-
interest, should actively promote a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. 
Even George W. Bush, late in the day, seems to have come to the con-
clusion that this would serve American national interests, although he 
has been reluctant to get very deeply involved or to spell out why this 
is important.
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The next president, Barack Obama, will have an opportunity to spell 
out for the American public and for those in the Middle East a strategy 
that links our interests in peace, in regional stability, in nonprolifera-
tion, and in energy security. This would be an ambitious program and 
would focus heavily on diplomacy. A crucial piece of the puzzle would 
be a serious effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Obviously, this 
would have to be complemented by a sensible policy in Iraq, a dip-
lomatic engagement with Iran and Syria, and a vision of a “Marshall 
Plan” for a Middle East at peace. All of this is ambitious, to say the 
least, but also very much worth doing, and likely to be much more 
widely supported internationally than the largely unilateral effort we 
made in Iraq. At the end of the day, it holds much more promise of 
promoting American values—including democratization and the mar-
ginalization of those who preach and use political violence—than does 
the more overtly muscular policy of the Bush administration. Both at 
home and in the Middle East, it is time for a change. •
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Appendix A
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (NOVEMBER 22, 1967)
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the 
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can 
live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter 
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance 
with Article 2 of the Charter,
Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of 
a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the applica-
tion of both the following principles:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent con-
flict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowl-
edgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recog-
nized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
Affirms further the necessity
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in 
the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of 
every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of 
demilitarized zones;
Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to pro-
ceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States con-
cerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful 
and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in 
this resolution;
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the prog-
ress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
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Appendix B
The Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and 
Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 
17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle 
East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.
Preamble
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:
* The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel 
and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its 
parts.
* After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the 
Middle East, whichis the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great 
religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East 
yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can 
be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for 
coexistence and cooperation among nations.
* The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the 
reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, 
and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace propos-
als made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by 
the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for 
peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be 
spared the tragedies of war.
* The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted 
norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for 
the conduct of relations among all states.
* To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor pre-
pared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of 
carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
* Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress 
toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation 
in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic develop-
ment, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.
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* Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation 
between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of 
peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special secu-
rity arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early 
warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures 
for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.
Framework
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, 
comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the 
conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 
in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly rela-
tions. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who 
have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this 
framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace 
not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other 
neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With 
that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:
* West Bank and Gaza
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people 
should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem 
in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West 
Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
1. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the 
parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza 
for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority 
has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing 
military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, 
Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. 
These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle 
of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate 
security concerns of the parties involved.
2. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing 
elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations 
of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza 
or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agree-
ment which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing 
authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli 
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armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining 
Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include 
arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A 
strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citi-
zens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols 
and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
3. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West 
Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five 
years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the 
beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine 
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neigh-
bors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the 
transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, 
consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree 
on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its 
neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel 
and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between 
Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status 
of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provi-
sions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations 
will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the 
nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must 
also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just 
requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination 
of their own future through:
1. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives 
of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the 
West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transi-
tional period.
2. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of 
the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
3. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the 
provisions of their agreement.
4. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating 
the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
William B. Quandt
47
5. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure 
the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and 
beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be 
constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants 
of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal secu-
rity matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
6. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to 
decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from 
the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent 
disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt 
with by this committee.
7. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested 
parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent imple-
mentation of the resolution of the refugee problem.
* Egypt-Israel
1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to 
settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in 
good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of 
the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties 
to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar 
peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. 
The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 
will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the 
modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under 
the treaty.
* Associated Principles
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below 
should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to 
states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide 
by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect 
include:
1. full recognition;
2. abolishing economic boycotts;
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3. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other par-
ties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the 
context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmo-
sphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all 
financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters 
related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working 
out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the 
peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The per-
manent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the 
peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested 
to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this 
Framework.
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-
Sadat
For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin
Witnessed by: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America
Last modified: July 21, 2001.
Appendix C
Peace Treaty Between the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt
Signed in Washington D.C. on March 26, 1979
The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the 
State of Israel;
PREAMBLE
Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehen-
sive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338;
Reaffirming their adherence to the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East 
Agreed at Camp David,” dated September 17, 1978;
Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to con-
stitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between 
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Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate 
peace with it on this basis;
Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a 
peace in which every state in the area can live in security;
Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is 
an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the 
attainment of settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;
Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with 
Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Frame-
work;
Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between them-
selves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of 
international law governing international relations in times of peace;
Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, 
in order to implement the “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty 
Between Egypt and Israel”;
Article I
1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be 
established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of 
this Treaty.
2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai 
behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as 
provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exer-
cise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.
3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the 
parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article 
III (3).
Article II
The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel in the recognized inter-
national boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Pal-
estine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the 
status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. 
Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial 
waters and airspace.
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Article III
1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations 
among states in times of peace. In particular:
1. They recognize and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence;
2. They recognize and will respect each other’s right to live in peace 
within their secure and recognized boundaries;
3. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indi-
rectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful 
means.
2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hos-
tility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its 
territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed 
on its territory , against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. 
Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, 
assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion 
or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that 
perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.
3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between 
them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural rela-
tions, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free 
movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment 
by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to 
achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions 
of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).
Article IV
1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of 
reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited 
force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and 
observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other 
security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.
2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas 
described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United 
Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such 
removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the 
affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise 
agree.
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3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of 
the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.
4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this 
Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual 
agreement of the Parties.
Article V
1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy 
the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through 
the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople 
Convention of 1888, applying to all nations, Israeli nationals, vessels and car-
goes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from 
Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected 
with usage of the canal.
2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be inter-
national waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable 
freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other’s 
right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the 
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.
Article VI
1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any 
way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United 
Nations.
2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this 
Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and indepen-
dently of any instrument external to this Treaty.
3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the appli-
cation in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to 
which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such 
conventions.
4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this 
Treaty.
5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a con-
flict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of 
their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and 
implemented.
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Article VII
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty 
shall be resolved by negotiations.
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be 
resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.
Article VIII
The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of 
all financial claims.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratifi-
cation.
2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of Sep-
tember, 1975.
3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded 
as an integral part hereof.
4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Anwar Sadat
Witnessed by: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America
Annex I
Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Agreements
Article I
Concept of Withdrawal
1. Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from 
the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification of this Treaty.
2. To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, the implementation of 
phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and estab-
lishment of zones set out in this Annex and in Map 1, hereinafter referred to as 
“the Zones.”
3. The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases:
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1. The interim withdrawal behind the line from east of El-Arish to Ras 
Mohammed as delineated on Map 2 within nine months from the date of 
exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
2. The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international bound-
ary not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of rati-
fication of this Treaty.
4. A Joint Commission will be formed immediately after the exchange of 
instruments of ratification of this Treaty in order to supervise and coordinate 
movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and 
timetables as necessary within the limits established by paragraph 3, above. 
Details relating to the Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the attached 
Appendix. The Joint Commission will be dissolved upon completion of final 
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
Article II
Determination of Final Lines and Zones
1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final 
withdrawal, the lines and the Zones delineated on Map 1 are to be established 
and organized as follows:
1. Zone A
1. Zone A is bounded on the east by line A (red line) and on the west 
by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on Map 1.
2. An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and 
its military installations, and field fortifications, will be in this Zone.
3. The main elements of that Division will consist of:
1. Three mechanized infantry brigades.
2. One armed brigade.
3. Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery 
pieces.
4. Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual sur-
face-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and above.
5. Up to 230 tanks.
6. Up to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types.
7. Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel.
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2. Zone B
1. Zone B is bounded by line B (green line) on the east and by line A 
(red line) on the west, as shown on Map 1.
2. Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weap-
ons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police 
in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements in the four Border Battal-
ions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel.
3. Land based, short range, low power, coastal warning points of the 
border patrol units may be established on the coast of this Zone.
4. There will be in Zone B field fortifications and military installations 
for the four border battalions.
3. Zone C
1. Zone C is bounded by line B (green line) on the west and the Inter-
national Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on Map 1.
2. Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be sta-
tioned in Zone C.
3. The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform 
normal police functions within this Zone.
4. The United Nations Force will be deployed within Zone C and per-
form its functions as defined in Article VI of this annex.
5. The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located 
within the following stationing areas shown on Map 1, and will establish its 
precise locations after consulons with Egypt:
1. In that part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of 
the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary.
2. In the Sharm el Sheikh area.
4. Zone D
1. Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the interna-
tional boundary on the west, as shown on Map 1.
2. In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infan-
try battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United 
Nations observers.
3. The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and 
anti-aircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles.
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4. The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist 
of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four 
thousand personnel.
2. Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted through 
entry check points designated by each Party and under its control. Such access 
shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.
3. Only those field fortifications, military installations, forces, and weapons 
specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones.
Article III
Aerial Military Regime
1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance flights of Egypt and Israel 
shall take place only over Zones A and D, respectively.
2. Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be stationed 
in Zones A and D, respectively.
3. Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone 
B and up to eight such aircraft may be maintained in Zone B. The Egyptian 
border unit.,., may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to perform their 
functions in Zone B.
4. The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police helicop-
ters to perform normal police functions in Zone C.
5. Only civilian airfields maybe built in the Zones.
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military 
aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the 
Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters.
Article IV
Naval Regime
1. Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of 
Zones A and D, respectively.
2. Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operate 
in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their 
functions in this Zone.
3. Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall per-
form normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C.
4. Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of 
innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party.
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5. Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones.
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval activi-
ties specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and in 
their territorial waters.
Article V
Early Warning Systems
Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in 
Zones A and D respectively.
Article VI
United Nations Operations
1. The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observ-
ers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their best efforts 
to prevent any violation of its terms.
2. With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as appropri-
ate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:
1. Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation 
posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.
2. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this 
Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed 
by the Parties.
3. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request 
from either Party.
4. Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in 
accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.
3. The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be imple-
mented in ones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by the 
United Nations Observers.
4. United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison offi-
cers of the respective Party.
5. The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both 
Parties.
6. The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will 
enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance 
of their tasks.
William B. Quandt
57
7. The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to authorize 
the crossing of the international boundary.
8. The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations 
Force and Observers will be drawn. They “ill be drawn from nations other than 
those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
9. The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command 
arrangements that will best assure the effective implementation of its respon-
sibilities.
Article VII
Liaison System
1. Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system between the 
Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide an effec-
tive method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under 
the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course 
of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher mili-
tary authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration. It is also 
intended to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on 
the part of either Party.
2. An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of El-Arish and 
an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city of Beer-Sheba. Each office 
will be headed by an officer of the respective country, and assisted by a num-
ber of officers.
3. A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also 
direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained 
by both offices.
Article VIII
Respect for War Memorials
Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials 
erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those erected by 
Egypt in Israel, and shall permit access to such monuments.
Article IX
Interim Arrangements
The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians behind the interim with-
drawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the United Nations 
prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the attached Appendix and 
Map 2.
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Appendix to Annex I
Organization of Movements in the Sinai
Article I
Principles of Withdrawal
1. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be 
accomplished in two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. The descrip-
tion and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. The Joint 
Commission will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of the United 
Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases not later than one 
month before the initiation of each phase of withdrawal.
2. Both parties agree on the following principles for the sequences of mili-
tary movements.
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this 
Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the current J and 
M Lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, 
hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal 
line, all military arrangements existing under that Agreement will remain 
in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this 
Appendix.
2. As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will imme-
diately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and temporary buffer 
zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining 
a separation of forces. United Nations forces’ deployment will precede the 
movement of any other personnel into these areas.
3. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacu-
ated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in 
accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.
4. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacu-
ated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall deploy in 
accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix, and will function 
in accordance with the provisions of Article II of Annex I.
5. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the 
United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.
6. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance 
with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.
7. Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian 
armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be offered in the evacu-
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ated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind 
the interim withdrawal line.
Article II
Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line
1. The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished in 
subphases as described in this Article and as shown on Map 3. Each subphase 
will be completed within the indicated number of months from the date of the 
exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty:
1. First subphase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw 
from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield, shown 
as Area I on Map 3.
2. Second subphase: within three months, Israeli armed forces will with-
draw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line A, shown 
as Area II on Map 3.
3. Third subphase: within five months, Israeli armed forces will with-
draw from the area east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on Map 3.
4. Fourth subphase: within seven months, Israeli armed forces will with-
draw from the area of El Tor–Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on Map 3.
5. Fifth subphase: Within nine months, Israeli armed forces will with-
draw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal line, including 
the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, 
shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing Israeli withdrawal behind the 
interim withdrawal line.
2. Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed forces 
as follows:
1. Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in accor-
dance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone A lying 
within Area I, until the completion of interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian 
armed forces as described Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up 
to the limits of the interim zone.
2. The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of Annex I 
will commence along the coasts of areas I, III and IV, upon completion of the 
second, third, and fourth subphases, respectively.
3. Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, upon 
completion of the first subphase one battalion will be deployed in Area I. 
A second battalion will deployed in Area II upon completion of the second 
subphase. A third battalion will deployed in Area Ill upon completion of the 
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third subphase. The second and third battalions mentioned above may also be 
deployed in any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai.
3. United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of the 1976 Agreement will rede-
ploy enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above upon the com-
pletion of the subphase, but will otherwise continue to function in accordance 
with the provisions of that Agreement in the remainder of that zone until the 
completion of interim withdrawal, as indicated in Article I of this Appendix.
4. Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road junc-
tion east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces up to the completion of interim 
withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in daylight upon four hours notice 
to the Egyptian liaison group and United Nations forces, will be escorted by 
United Nations forces, and will be in accordance with schedules coordinated 
by the Joint Commission. An Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys 
to assure uninterrupted movement. The Joint Commission may approve other 
arrangements for convoys.
Article III
United Nations Forces
1. The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as nec-
essary to perform the functions described in the Appendix up to the time of 
completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the Parties agree to 
the redeployment of the United Nations Emergency Force.
2. United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this Appen-
dix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.
3. When United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions 
of Article and II of this Appendix, they will perform the functions of verifica-
tion in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and will 
establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts in the 
temporary buffer zones described in Article II above. Other functions of the 
United Nations forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in 
Article V of this Appendix.
Article IV
Joint Commission and Liaison
1. The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function 
from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the 
date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
2. The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party 
headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of 
the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, 
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or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint 
Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.
3. The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrange-
ments described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement 
of both Parties, it will:
1. coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and super-
vise their implementation;
2. address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the imple-
mentation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported 
by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of 
Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
3. assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of 
their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verification when 
referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and this Appendix;
4. organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines 
and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
5. supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from 
Israel to Egypt;
6. agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing 
bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
7. organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the 
El Arish–Ras Mohammed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of 
Annex III;
8. conduct its operations through the use of joint liaison teams consisting 
of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a 
standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint 
Commission;
9. provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command 
implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, 
maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force 
stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific 
areas for any assistance as needed;
10. discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place 
before it.
4. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. 
In the event that either Party of the Command of the United Nations Force 
requests a specific meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.
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5. The Joint Committee will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of 
the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. 
The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into 
force of this Treaty.
Article V
Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities
1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a 
separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and 
adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementa-
tion of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. 
Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police 
functions within this zone.
2. The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance 
patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in order to ensure 
compliance with the terms of this Article.
3. In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be 
coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate military 
technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and desig-
nated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 
59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 5933-1527), and T4 (map central coordi-
nate 61130979) under the following principles:
1. The technical installations shall be manned by technical and admin-
istrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection 
(revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and 
ammunition), as follows:
* T1—up to 150 personnel
* T2 and T3—up to 350 personnel
* T4—up to 200 personnel
2. Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except offi-
cers who may carry personal weapons.
3. Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and con-
duct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer 
zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least 
once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the 
installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will 
immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation’s visual 
and electronic surveillance or communications role.
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4. Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative pur-
poses, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may 
occur uninterruptedly from the United Nations check points to the perimeter 
of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the 
United Nations forces.
5. Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations 
items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.
6. As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:
1. Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general maintenance 
equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineer-
ing equipment necessary for the maintenance of the sites. All vehicles shall be 
unarmed.
2. Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, 
and communications cables which serve the site. At each of the three installa-
tion locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with 
up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel 
with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if 
needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for 
special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. 
The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.
7. Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only 
during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall 
be as follows:
1. T1: Through a United Nations check point, and via the road 
between Abu Aweigila and the intersection of the Abu Aweigila road and the 
Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as shown on Map 2.
2. T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road 
constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.
3. T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, 
and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The heli-
copters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside 
the perimeter of the installations.
8. Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance 
of each intended movement to and from the installations.
9. Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon 
medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice 
to the United Nations Force.
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4. The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article 
requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the Joint Commis-
sion.
5. These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces with-
draw from the interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by the parties.
Article VI
Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers
Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Par-
ties in accordance with the following guidelines:
1. Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint 
Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams 
to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon con-
dition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control 
and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for 
disposition of installations and articles within the installations.
2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructures, utilities, 
and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. 
Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance 
and operation of the facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to 
observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a 
period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.
3. When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and 
El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and 
ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged 
beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make 
available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently avail-
able water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, 
unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.
4. Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barri-
ers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from 
which it withdraws, according to the following concept:
1. Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, 
roads and major installations and utilities.
2. For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or 
destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to 
Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 
days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.
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3. Egyptian engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces 
enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian 
plans to be submitted prior to implementation.
Article VII
Surveillance Activities
1. Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as 
follows:
1. Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveil-
lance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of 
final Israeli withdrawal.
2. Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limi-
tations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces 
have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II 
of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain 
behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of 
either Party or of the United Nations.
3. Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as 
described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.
2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to 
continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until comple-
tion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. 
Thereafter, the Mission be terminated.
Article VIII
Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty
Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of 
the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.
ANNEX III
Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties
Article 1
Diplomatic and Consular Relations
The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange 
ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.
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Article 2
Economic and Trade Relations
1. The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal eco-
nomic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon com-
pletion of the interim withdrawal.
2. As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of 
the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to con-
cluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting 
beneficial economic relations.
Article 3
Cultural Relations
1. The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following comple-
tion of the interim withdrawal.
2. They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and 
shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the 
interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cul-
tural agreement for this purpose.
Article 4
Freedom of Movement
1. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the 
free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its 
territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles 
of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the 
free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the 
other.
2. Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical signifi-
cance will be provided on a non-discriminatory basis.
Article 5
Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations
1. The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighbourly rela-
tions and agree to consider means to promote such relations.
2. The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development 
in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make 
to this end.
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3. The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and 
will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.
Article 6
Transportation and Telecommunications
1. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges 
and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are 
both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
1944 (“The Chicago Convention”) and the International Air Services Transit 
Agreement, 1944.
2. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national 
emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be 
applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.
3. Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left by Israel near El-Arish, Rafah, 
Ras El-Nagb and Sharm El-Sheikh shall be for civilian purposes only, including 
possible commercial use by all nations.
4. As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of 
the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the pur-
pose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.
5. The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their 
countries and will consider further road and rail links. The Parties further 
agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, 
Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of per-
sons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their 
sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective 
territory.
6. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, 
telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay 
services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Par-
ties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.
7. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant nor-
mal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as ves-
sels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other. Such access will be 
granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of 
other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the 
exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned treaty.
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Article 7
Enjoyment of Human Rights
The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and free-
doms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
Article 8
Territorial Seas
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each 
Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage 
through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.
Hebrew Translation
Agreed Minutes
Knesset
© Copyright 1999, The State of Israel. All Rights Reserved.
Appendix D
The Reagan Plan (September 1, 1982)
Today has been a day that should make all of us proud. It marked the end of 
the successful evacuation of the P.L.O. from Beirut, Lebanon. This peaceful step 
could never have been taken without the good offices of the United States and, 
especially, the truly heroic work of a great American diplomat, Philip Habib. 
Thanks to his efforts I am happy to announce that the U.S. Marine contingent 
helping to supervise the evacuation has accomplished its mission.
Our young men should be out of Lebanon within two weeks. They, too, have 
served the cause of peace with distinction and we can all be very proud of 
them.
But the situation in Lebanon is only part of the overall problem of the conflict 
in the Middle East. So, over the past two weeks, while events in Beirut domi-
nated the front page, America was engaged in a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort 
to lay the groundwork for a broader peace in the region.
For once, there were no premature leaks as U.S. diplomatic missions traveled 
to Mid-East capitals and I met here at home with a wide range of experts to 
map out an American peace initiative for the long-suffering peoples of the 
Middle East, Arab and Israeli alike.
It seemed to me that, with the agreement in Lebanon, we had an opportunity 
for a more far-reaching peace effort in the region—and I was determined to 
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seize that moment. In the words of the scripture, the time had come to “follow 
after the things which make for peace.”
Tonight, I want to report to you on the steps we have taken, and the prospects 
they can open up for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
America has long been committed to bringing peace to this troubled region. 
For more than a generation, successive U.S. administrations have endeavoured 
to develop a fair and workable process that could lead to a true and lasting 
Arab-Israeli peace. Our involvement in the search for Mid-East peace is not a 
matter of preference; it is a moral imperative. The strategic importance of the 
region to the U.S. is well known.
But our policy is motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an 
irreversible commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly 
states. Nor can we ignore the fact that the wellbeing of much of the world’s 
economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East. Finally, our tradi-
tional humanitarian concerns dictate a continuing effort to peacefully resolve 
conflicts.
When our administration assumed office in January 1981, 1 decided that the 
general framework for our Middle East policy should follow the broad guide-
lines laid down by my predecessors.
There were two basic issues we had to address: First, there was the strategic 
threat Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn country. We owe it to ourselves and 
to posterity, to move quickly, to build upon this achievement. A stable and 
revived Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for peace in the region. The peo-
ple of Lebanon deserve the best efforts of the international community to turn 
the nightmares of the past several years into a new dawn of hope.
But the opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in 
Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild, we must also move to resolve the root 
causes of conflict between the Arabs and Israelis.
This war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but two consequences are 
key to the peace process:
First, the military losses of the P.L.O. have not diminished the yearning of the 
Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims; and second, while Israel’s 
military success in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are sec-
ond to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to 
Israel and her neighbours.
The question now is how to reconcile Israel’s legitimate security concerns with 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. And that answer can only come at the 
negotiating table. Each party must recognize that the outcome must be accept-
able to all and that true peace will require compromises by all.
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So, tonight, I am calling for a fresh start. This is the moment for all those 
directly concerned to get involved in—or lend their support to—a workable 
basis for peace. The Camp David agreement remains the foundation of our 
policy. Its language provides all parties with the leeway they need for success-
ful negotiations.
I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be 
achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring magnanimity, vision and 
courage.
I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations 
are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel’s right to a secure future.
And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of Israel—and the reality that 
peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiations.
In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the United States has a spe-
cial responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties 
to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.
The time has come for a new realism on the part of all the peoples of the Mid-
dle East. The State of Israel is an accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged 
legitimacy within the community of nations. But Israel’s legitimacy has thus 
far been recognized by too few countries, and has been denied by every Arab 
state except Egypt. Israel exists; it has a right to exist in peace behind secure 
and defensible borders, and it has a right to demand of its neighbours that they 
recognize those facts.
I have personally followed and supported Israel’s heroic struggle for survival, 
ever since the founding of the State of Israel 34 years ago. In the pre-1967 bor-
ders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel’s 
population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about 
to ask Israel to live that way again.
The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in the region. The depar-
ture of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homeless-
ness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is 
more than a question of refugees. I agree.
The Camp David agreement recognized that fact when it spoke of “the legiti-
mate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.” For peace 
to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by 
the conflict. Only through broader participation in the peace process—most 
immediately by Jordan and by the Palestinians—will Israel be able to rest con-
fident in the knowledge that its security and integrity will be respected by its 
neighbours. Only through the process of negotiation can all the nations of the 
Middle East achieve a secure peace.
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These, then, are our general goals. What are the specific new American posi-
tions and why are we taking them?
In the Camp David talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt have felt free to 
express openly their views as to what the outcome should be. Understandably, 
their views have differed on many points.
The United States has thus far sought to play the role of mediator; we have 
avoided public comment on the key issues. We have always recognized—and 
continue to recognize—that only the voluntary agreement of those parties 
most directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring solution. But it 
has become evident to me that some clearer sense of America’s position on the 
key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process.
First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time 
during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have 
full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the 
principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the 
legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
The purpose of the five-year period of transition which would begin after free 
elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority is to prove to the Palestin-
ians that they can run their own affairs, and that such Palestinian autonomy 
poses no threat to Israel’s security.
The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the 
purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate 
adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could 
create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further 
settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only 
diminishes the confidence of the Arabs and a final outcome can be freely and 
fairly negotiated.
I want to make the American position clearly understood: the purpose of this 
transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of domestic authority 
from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the 
same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel’s security require-
ments.
Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and 
Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of 
an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on 
the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and 
Gaza.
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So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Pal-
estinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation 
or permanent control by Israel.
There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, 
of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations; but it is the 
firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the 
West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a 
durable, just and lasting peace.
We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict 
should be resolved through the negotiations involving an exchange of territory 
for peace. This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David 
agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation-stone 
of America’s Middle East peace effort.
It is the United States’ position that—in return for peace—the withdrawal 
provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and 
Gaza.
When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the 
extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily 
affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrange-
ments offered in return.
Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its 
final status should be decided through negotiations.
In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support posi-
tions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises and likely to promote a 
sound agreement. We will also put forward our own detailed proposals when 
we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United States will 
oppose any proposal—from any party and at any point in the negotiating 
process—that threatens the security of Israel. America’s commitment to the 
security of Israel is ironclad. And I might add, so is mine.
During the past few days, our ambassadors in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia have presented to their host countries the proposal in full detail that I 
have outlined here tonight.
I am convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security and bring 
durability to an Arab-Israeli peace.
The United States will stand by these principles with total dedication. They 
are fully consistent with Israel’s security requirements and the aspirations of 
the Palestinians. We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace table 
as envisaged by the Camp David Accords. And I fervently hope that the Pales-
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tinians and Jordan, with the support of their Arab colleagues, will accept this 
opportunity.
Tragic turmoil in the Middle East runs back to the dawn of history. In our 
modern day, conflict after conflict has taken its brutal toll there. In an age of 
nuclear challenge and economic interdependence, such conflicts are a threat 
to all the people of the world, not just the Middle East itself. It is time for us 
all—in the Middle East and around the world—to call a halt to conflict, hatred 
and prejudice; it is time for us all to launch a common effort for reconstruction, 
peace and progress.
It has often been said—and regrettably too often been true—that the story of 
the search for peace and justice in the Middle East is a tragedy of opportunities 
missed.
In the aftermath of the settlement in Lebanon we now face an opportunity for 
a broader peace. This time we must not let it slip from our grasp. We must look 
beyond the difficulties and obstacles of the present and move with fairness and 
resolve toward a brighter future. We owe it to ourselves—and to posterity—to 
do no less. For if we miss this chance to make a fresh start, we may look back 
on this moment from some later vantage point and realize how much that fail-
ure cost us all.
These, then, are the principles upon which American policy toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict will be based. I have made a personal commitment to see that 
they endure and, God willing, that they will come to be seen by all reasonable, 
compassionate people as fair, achievable and in the interests of all who wish to 
see peace in the Middle East.
Tonight, on the eve of what can be the dawning of new hope for the people of 
the troubled Middle East—and for all the world’s people who dream of a just 
and peaceful future—I ask you, my fellow Americans, for your support and 
your prayers in this great undertaking.
Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Appendix E
“Oslo Accords”
Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement: 1993
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team representing 
the Palestinian people agree that it is time to put an end to decades of con-
frontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, 
and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to 
achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic recon-
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ciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree 
to the following principles.
Article 1 AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The aim of the Israeli Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East 
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority, the elected Council, (the “Council”) for the Palestin-
ian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole 
peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.
Article II FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD
The agreed framework for the interim period is set in this declaration of prin-
ciples.
Article III ELECTIONS
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may 
govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general 
political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and 
international observation, while Palestinian police will insure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the 
elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal 
of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of 
this Declaration of Principles.
3. The elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward 
the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just 
requirements.
Article IV JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza territory, except for 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two 
sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose 
integrity will be preserved during the interim period.
Article V TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIA-
TIONS
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the 
Gaza strip and Jericho area.
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2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not 
later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, includ-
ing: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border, relations 
and cooperation with their neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agreed that the outcome of the permanent status negotia-
tions should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the 
interim period.
Article VI PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILI-
TIES
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and withdrawal 
from the Gaza and Jericho area, a transfer of authority from Israeli military 
government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this 
task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of 
preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and 
the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, with the view of 
promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority 
will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and 
culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism, the Palestinian side 
will commence in building the Palestinian police, as agreed upon. Pending the 
inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of addi-
tional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.
Article VII INTERIM AGREEMENT
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the 
interim period (the “Interim Agreement”).
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the 
Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsi-
bilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to 
the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive 
authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the 
independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon 
the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the 
powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article 
VI above.
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4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inau-
guration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electric-
ity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a 
Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a 
Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, 
and any other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agree-
ment that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dis-
solved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.
Article VIII PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, 
while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against 
external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for 
the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.
Article IX LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim 
Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in 
remaining spheres.
Article X JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Prin-
ciples and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon 
the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian 
Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring 
coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.
Article XI ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development 
of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this 
Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Com-
mittee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative 
manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and 
Annex IV.
Article XII LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to partici-
pate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on one hand, and the 
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Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation 
between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continu-
ing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission 
of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with 
necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of com-
mon concern will be dealt with by the Committee.
Article XIII REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than 
the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of 
Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that 
its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified location will be gradually implemented 
commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and 
internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
Article XIV ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERI-
CHO AREA
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the 
protocol attached as Annex II.
Article XV RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the Declaration 
of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, 
shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be 
established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be solved by a mecha-
nism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes lating to the interim 
period, which cannot be settled through reconciliation. To this end, upon the 
agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.
Article XVI ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING 
REGIONAL PROGRAMS
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instru-
ment for promoting a “Marshall Plan,” the for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.
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Article XVII MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its sign-
ing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes 
pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
Appendix F
The Clinton Parameters: Clinton Proposal on Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Meeting with President Clinton, White House, December 23, 2000
Attendance
United States: President Clinton, Secretary Albright, John Podesta, Samuel 
Berger, Steve Richetti, Bruce Reidel, Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, Robert Malley, 
Gamal Hilal
Palestine: Sa’eb Erakat, Mohammad Dahlan, Samih Abed, Ghaith Al-Omari.
Israel: Shlomo Ben-Ami, Gilead Sher, Penny Medan, Shlomo Yanai, Gidi Grin-
stein
Minutes
President Clinton:
Territory:
Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-
90%s, between 94–96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State.
The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1–3% 
in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage.
The Parties also should consider the swap of leased land to meet their 
respective needs. There are creative ways of doing this that should address 
Palestinian and Israeli needs and concerns.
The Parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:
* 80% of settlers in blocks.
* Contiguity.
* Minimize annexed areas.
* Minimize the number of Palestinian affected.
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Security:
The key lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by 
mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the 
agreement between both sides.
My best judgment is that the Israeli presence would remain in fixed loca-
tions in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the International force for 
another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable 
regional developments that diminish the threats to Israel.
On early warning stations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West 
Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review 
every 10 years with any changes in the status to be mutually agreed.
Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you will still have 
to develop a map of the relevant areas and routes. But in defining what is an 
emergency, I propose the following definition:
Imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel’s national security of a military 
nature that requires the activation of a national state emergency.
Of course, the international forces will need to be notified of any such deter-
mination.
On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over 
its airspace but that two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli 
training and operational needs.
I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a 
“demilitarized state” while the Palestinian side proposes “a state with limited 
arms.” As a compromise, I suggest calling it a “non-militarized state.”
This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian 
security forces. Palestine will have an international force for border security 
and deterrent purposes.
Jerusalem and Refugees:
I have a sense that the remaining gaps have more to do with formulations 
than practical realities.
Jerusalem:
The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are 
Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. I urge the two sides to work 
on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.
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Regarding the Haram/Temple Mount, I believe that the gaps are not related 
to practical administration but to the symbolic issues of sovereignty and to 
finding a way to accord respect to the religious beliefs of both sides.
I know you have been discussing a number of formulations, and you can 
agree one of these. I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing 
Palestinian effective control over the Haram while respecting the conviction of 
the Jewish people.
Regarding either one of these two formulations will be international moni-
toring to provide mutual confidence.
1—Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram, and Israeli sovereignty over a) 
the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part; b)the 
Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part.
There will be a fine commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram 
or behind the Wall.
2—Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the 
Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation 
under the Haram and behind the Wall such that mutual consent would be 
requested before any excavation can take place.
Refugees:
I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to 
what will happen on a practical level.
I believe that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suf-
fering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war and the need 
to assist the international community in addressing the problem.
An international commission should be established to implement all the 
aspects that flow from your agreement: compensation, resettlement, rehabilita-
tion, etc.
The US is prepared to lead an international effort to help the refugees.
The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. 
I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian lead-
ership to appear to be abandoning this principle.
The Israeli side could not accept any reference to a right of return that 
would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel’s sovereign pol-
icies and admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.
Any solution must address both needs.
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The solution will have to be consistent with the two-state approach that 
both sides have accepted as a way to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the 
state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of 
Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.
Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be that the Pal-
estinian state would be the focal point for Palestinians who choose to return to 
the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.
I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return that will 
make clear that there is no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does 
not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.
In light of the above, I propose two alternatives:
1—Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to his-
toric Palestine, or,
2—Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their 
homeland.
The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way 
that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list the five possible 
homes for the refugees:
1—The state of Palestine.
2—Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap.
3—Rehabilitation in host country.
4—Resettlement in third country.
5—Admission to Israel.
In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the 
West Bank, Gaza Strip, and areas acquired in the land swap would be the right 
of all Palestinian refugees, while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement 
in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of 
those countries.
Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so 
that some of the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel’s 
sovereign decision.
I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in Leba-
non.
The parties would agree that this implements resolution 194.
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The End of Conflict:
I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its 
implementation put an end to all claims. This could be implemented through a 
UN Security Counsel Resolution that notes that Resolutions 242 and 338 have 
been implemented and through the release of Palestinian prisoners.
Concluding remarks:
I believe that this is the outline of a fair and lasting agreement.
It gives the Palestinian people the ability to determine their future on their 
own land, a sovereign and viable state recognized by the international com-
munity, Al-Quds as its capital, sovereignty over the Haram, and new lives for 
the refugees.
It gives the people of Israel a genuine end to the conflict, real security, the 
preservation of sacred religious ties, the incorporation of 80% of the settlers 
into Israel, and the largest Jewish Jerusalem in history recognized by all as its 
capital.
This is the best that I can do. Brief your leaders and tell me if they are pre-
pared to come for discussions based on these ideas. If so, I would meet them 
next week separately. If not, I have taken this as far as I can.
These are my ideas. If they are not accepted, they are not just off the table, 
they also go with me when I leave office.
Note: After reading the above text to the Israeli and Palestinian delegates in the 
Roosevelt Room of the White House, President Clinton left the room. His aides 
went over the text subsequently to ensure that each side had copied the points 
accurately. No written text was presented. This version is derived from that 
published in Haaretz (English), January 1, 2001, and a slightly more complete 
version issued by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center.
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